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Abstract—In this paper, we deal with the formal verification of
an encryption scheme for Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs). Es-
pecially, we present our first results on building a framework ded-
icated to modelling and verification of WSNs aspects. To achieve
our goal, we propose to specify WSNs models written in Petri nets
using Promela constructs in order to verify correctness properties
of them using SPIN Model checker. We first specify in Promela
a Petri net description of an encryption scheme for WSNs that
describes its behavior. Then, correctness properties that express
requirements on the system’s behavior are formulated in Linear
Temporal Logic (LTL). Finally, SPIN model checker is used to
check if a specific correctness property holds for the model, and,
if not, to provide a counterexample: a computation that does not
satisfy this property. This counterexample will help to detect the
source of the eventual problem and to correct it.
Keywords—Model checking, Encryption Scheme, Wireless Sen-
sor Networks, Petri nets, SPIN/Promela, LTL.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) are defined as compound
networks of a large number of tiny devices called sensor nodes,
which have limited processing power, storage, bandwidth, and
energy [8]. The WSNs are widely emerging as a promising
technology to stimulate the design and the implementation
of self-configuring and cost-effective monitoring infrastruc-
tures. They are applied in many domains, such as military
applications, traffic management, ecological and environmen-
tal monitoring. Nowadays the WSNs are increasingly being
required for applications where the data reliability needs to
be guaranteed. This can be achieved when a precise model is
described and an efficient verification is ensured. Besides, are
emerging the challenges of detecting the relevant quantities,
collecting the data, assessing and evaluating the information,
performing decision making and alarm functions. Due to this,
many research works have been directed in this sense.
In this direction we focus on the description of WSNs
models and their early verification. Thus errors would be
detected before execution time and hence many problems such
as accidents can be avoided.
When focus on modelling, Petri nets were originally devel-
oped to meet the need in specifying process synchronization,
asynchronous events, concurrent operations, and conflicts or
resource sharing for a variety of industrial automated systems
at the discrete-event level. For that reasons, we adopt WSNs
modelled with Petri nets. As for the verification of this model,
we can perform a checking of properties related to the be-
havior of the system such as appropriate synchronization and
repetitive activities. However there are critical design errors
that are not discovered during classical testing. That’s why
we refer to formal methods. In addition, advanced wireless
sensor network algorithms pose challenges to their formal
modelling and analysis, such as modelling real-time behaviors
and analyzing both correctness and performance.
Formal methods and tools have been proved useful to give
high-level and precise descriptions of computer systems, and
to analyze exhaustively these systems at early phases of the
system development process. They are a particular kind of
mathematically-based techniques for the specification, devel-
opment and verification of software and hardware systems.
The use of formal methods for software and hardware design
is motivated by the expectation that, as in other engineering
disciplines, performing appropriate mathematical analysis can
contribute to the reliability and robustness of a design. They
are especially promising when used in the development of
high-integrity systems where security is of great importance.
One of the well known formal methods is Model Checking.
This is a verification technique that explores all possible
system states in a brute-force manner. The principle of model
checking consists on generating all possible executions of
a process and checking that the correctness specifications
hold in each execution. Thus, the main task is to determine
whether the specification is satisfied by the process model.
Moreover, generating states and checking specifications can
be done mechanically by a software tool. This tool, called
model checker, examines all possible system scenarios in a
systematic manner. In this way, it can be shown that a given
system model truly satisfies a certain property. There are many
powerful model checkers such as NuSMV [1], BLAST [3] and
SPIN [4], [5].
SPIN is a tool for analyzing the logical consistency of
concurrent systems, specifically of data communication proto-
cols. The system is described in a modelling language called
Promela (PROcess MEta LAnguage). This language allows
for the dynamic creation of concurrent processes which can
communicate by means of channels or shared variables. SPIN
models are verified for correctness of model interactions,
while minimizing the internal functional interdependencies.
SPIN focus on the verification of asynchronous interactions
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of distributed software, and that’s what makes it one of the
most powerful tools for model checking.
Motivated by the interest of formal modelling and verifica-
tion of WSNs models, we propose in this paper a model check-
ing Technique for verification of an encryption scheme for
WSNs. We adopt a Petri net representation of the encryption
scheme and specify it in Promela language. Then, we express
in LTL the correctness properties of this specification. Finally,
we invoke SPIN to check if these properties are verified by
the WSN model specified in Promela.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is
dedicated to present preliminaries on WSNs and encryption
scheme, Petri nets, model checking and LTL. In section 3, we
present an overview of Petri nets modelling of WSNs models.
Section 4 describes our approach of specifying a WSN Petri
net in Promela and the constructs used to express its behavior.
In section 5, we show how to formulate in LTL correctness
properties of WSNs models. Section 6 concludes the paper
and gives directions to future work.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Wireless Sensor Networks and Encryption
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) have been drawing in-
creasing attention due to many successful applications [6], [7],
[11]. The WSNs are defined as compound networks of a large
number of tiny devices called sensor nodes, which have limited
processing power, storage, bandwidth, and energy. In addition,
a WSN might be often deployed on a large scale throughout
a geographic region in hostile environments [8]. According to
how sensors are grouped and how the information of sensors is
routed through the network, there are two basic architectures
of WSN: flat and hierarchical. In a flat architecture all nodes
have almost the same communication capabilities and resource
constraints and the information is routed by each sensor. In
a hierarchical architecture, the sensor nodes are grouped in
clusters where one of the member nodes is the ”cluster head”.
This node is responsible for management and routing tasks. A
sensor node is composed of four basic components: sensing
unit, processing unit, transceiver unit and a power unit.
In wireless communications, encryption/decryption is very
important. Encryption is the conversion of data into a cipher-
text which cannot be easily understood by unauthorized peo-
ple. Decryption is the process of converting encrypted data
back into its original form yielding it to be understood.
Encryption/decryption is a good idea when carrying out any
kind of sensitive transaction, such as an online purchase by a
credit card.
B. Petri nets
A Petri net is a 4-tuple N = (P, T, F,W ) where P and T are
two finite non-empty sets of places and transitions respectively,
P ∩ T = ∅ , F ⊆ (P × T ) ∪ (T × P ) is the flow relation,
and W : (P × T )∪ (T ×P )→ N is the weight function of N
satisfying W (x, y) = 0⇔ (x, y) /∈ F .
If W (u) = 1 ∀u ∈ F then N is said to be ordinary net and
it is denoted by N = (P, T, F ).
For all x ∈ P ∪ T , the preset of x is •x = {y|(y, x) ∈ F}
and the postset of x is x• = {y|(x, y) ∈ F}.
A marking of a Petri net N is a function M : P → N. The
initial marking of N is denoted by M0.
A transition t ∈ T is enabled in a marking M (denoted by
M [t〉) if and only if ∀p ∈ •t :M(p) ≥W (p, t).
If transition t is enabled in marking M , it can be fired,
leading to a new marking M ′ such that: ∀p ∈ P : M ′(p) =
M(p)−W (p, t) +W (t, p).
The firing is denoted by M [t〉M ′.
The set of all markings reachable from a marking M is
denoted by [M〉.
For a place p of P, we denote by Mp the marking given by
Mp(p) = 1 and Mp(p′) = 0 ∀p′ 6= p.
Petri nets are represented as follows: places are represented
by circles, transitions by boxes, the flow relation is represented
by drawing an arc between x and y whenever (x, y) is in
the relation, and the weight function labels the arcs whenever
their weights are greater than 1. A marking M of a Petri net
is represented by drawing M(p) black tokens into the circle
representing the place p.
C. Model checking Techniques
Model checking is a verification technique that explores all
possible system states in a brute-force manner. Similar to a
computer chess program that checks possible moves, a model
checker, the software tool that performs the model checking,
examines all possible system scenarios in a systematic manner.
In this way, it can be shown that a given system model truly
satisfies a certain property. It is a real challenge to examine the
largest possible state spaces that can be treated with current
means, i.e., processors and memories.
There are many powerful model checkers such as NuSMV,
BLAST and SPIN.
SPIN model checker is a system that can verify models of
computerized systems. The name SPIN was originally chosen
as an acronym for Simple Promela INterpreter. It can be
used in two basic modes: as a simulator and as a verifier. In
simulation mode, SPIN can be used to get a quick impression
of the types of behavior that are captured by a system model,
as it is being built. Some optimization techniques, e.g., partial
order reduction and graph encoding, are available to help
reduce the usage of CPU time or memory space.
D. Linear Temporal Logic
SPIN checks properties formulated in Liner Temporal
Logic. An LTL formula f may contain any lowercase propo-
sitional symbol p, combined with unary or binary, boolean
and/or temporal operators. LTL is built up from a set of
propositional variables p1, p2, ..., the usual logic connectives
(¬, ∨, ∧, → and ↔) and the temporal modal operators (♦:
eventually, : always, ◦: next and U:until) (Fig. 1).
The semantic of a formula is given in terms of computations
and the states of a computation. The atomic propositions of
temporal logic can be evaluated in a single state independently
of a computation.
Fig. 1. LTL Connectives and Temporal Operators
III. PETRI NETS MODELLING OF WSNS
In our prospective concerning the establishment of a general
modelling and verification framework of WSNs, we propose
to adopt Petri nets representations of WSNs. In fact, Petri nets
have been used for their formal semantics, graphical nature,
expressiveness, analysis techniques and tools.
In the literature, several works on the modelling of many
aspects related to WSNs using Petri nets were investigated.
A survey and a generalization of these works are planned to
be one of the objectives of our future work. In this paper, we
propose a model checking technique for the verification of an
existing Petri net model of an encryption scheme for WSNs
[8].
The adopted example (Fig. 2) describes the secure trans-
mission of a binary message sequence between a header
node and the base station in a hierarchical WSN. The header
node (transmitter of the message) is on the left side and the
base node, (receiver of the message) is on the right side.
The message sequence generated by an elliptic curve en-
crypter/LDPC Encoder yields to a codeword as output c. This
codeword is converted via a modulator block in a modulator
signal x. Additional wireless perturbations are injected into the
transmission channel model. The superposition of the signal
x and the fading yields to a corrupted signal xˆ. Whenever
this message is received by base node, it is converted again
to a binary sequence through a demodulator block called cˆ
estimating the codeword c. The LDPC Decoder/Ellitic Curve
Decrypter uses an inverse function to transfer the binary
sequence into a message sequence mˆ providing hence an
estimate of the original message m. The secure transmission
process ends whenever the base station receives mˆ.
The Petri net of this secure transmission process is shown
in Fig. 3. This Petri net shows the different status of the
message transmitted through the communication process. The
transitions represent the tasks of transforming the message into
different phases of the process. The meanings of each place
and transition are given respectively in tables I and II.
In the next section, we present how to specify in Promela
a WSN modelled as a Petri net.
Fig. 3. Petri net of the communication system
TABLE I
THE PETRI NET PLACES DESCRIPTION
Place Description Place Description
P0 New message P13 LDPC encoder (sender side)
P1 Transmitter idle P14 LDPC decoder (receiver side)
P2 Received message P15 Encoder message (codeword)
P3 Incoming message P16 Demodulated message
P4 EC on the sender side (resource) P17 Received idle
P5 Valid key (receiver public key) P18 Modulated message
P6 EC on the receiver side (resource) P19 Channel input
P7 Valid key (receiver private key) P20 Channel output
P8 Decrypted message P21 Channel idle
P9 LDPC decoder and EC restoring (receiver) P22 Fading process
P10 LDPC decoder and EC restoring (sender) P23 Noise process
P11 Encrypted message P24 Channel parameters restoring
P12 Decoded message
TABLE II
THE PETRI NET TRANSITIONS DESCRIPTION
Transition Description Transition Description
T0 Transmit message T7 Encode message
T1 Wait for message T8 Decode message
T2 Deliver message T9 Modulate message
T3 Decrypt message T10 Demodulated message
T4 Encrypt message T11 Send message to channel
T5 Restore parameters T12 Perturb Message
T6 Restore parameters T13 Reset channel parameters
IV. WSN MODEL BASED ON PROMELA
The modelling of Petri nets with Promela language is first
introduced by Holzmann in [4], [5]. In this work, a Petri net
is represented as a single process describing each firing of its
transitions.
In [12], the authors rewrite the Petri net representation given
Fig. 2. Communication model
in [4], [5] by representing the places set P by an array of
|P | elements rather than |P | byte variables. The Promela
specification of a Petri net given in [4] describes only the
marking of places and does not take into account the firing
count of transitions. However, it is necessary to save the firing
count of each transition while progressing in the execution of
the process. Such information will be used in the verification
of the correctness properties.
We now present our Promela specification of the Petri
net’s description of the encryption scheme presented in the
previous section. This specification consists on an application
of our general approach of mapping from Petri nets to Promela
presented in [13].
We describe (in Promela) a Petri net in terms of the marking
of places and the firing count of transitions. For that, we
represent the places (resp. the transitions) by an array PL
(resp. TR) of integers with length equal to the number of
places (resp. transitions). These arrays contain initially zero
in each element.
The behaviour of a Petri net can be described in terms of
system states and their changes. These changes influence the
elements of tables PL and TR (initialized to zero). A marking
is initialized to Mi and it is changed according to the following
transition rule: A transition t is enabled if each input place p
of t is marked. Moreover, an enabled transition t may fire or
not, and a firing of t removes one token from all p ∈ •t and
adds one token to each output place of t.
These concepts are translated in the corresponding Promela
description of a Petri net as follows: The firing of a transition
t consists on decreasing by 1 the integer corresponding to
each place p ∈ •t in the array PL and increasing by 1 the
elements of PL corresponding to the output places (p ∈ t•).
Although, we increase by 1 the element of TR corresponding
to the transition t to mark that t is fired once.
These modifications are ensured by the macro defini-
tions fire, add1, add2, ..,addS, remove1, remove2, .., and
removeK where S is the maximum number of possible input
places and K is the maximum number of possible output
places.
If a transition t has I input places and J output places, the
firing of t is ensured by a call to the following macros with
the appropriate arguments:
1) removeI(p1, p2, .., pI) destructs one token from each
input place. This destruction is allowed only if these
input places are marked (PL[index of pj ] > 0, 1 ≤
j ≤ I).
2) fire(t) increases by 1 the element corresponding to t
in TR.
3) addJ(p1, p2, .., pJ ) produces one token in each output
place.
Note that the first action contains the firing condition, thus
the second and third actions are executed only if the first one
is achieved.
To map the skeleton of any Promela Petri net specification,
we propose to draw it in BNF (Backus Naur Form) in which
< Process > is the axiom (initial symbol):
<P r o c e s s> : : = i n i t {
<I n i t i a l M a r k i n g>
do
<F i r i n g s>
od
}
<F i r i n g s> : : = <F i r i n g> <F i r i n g s>
<F i r i n g> : : = : : atomic {
<Enabled Tk> −> <Fire Tk>
}
The init keyword is used to declare the behavior of a
process that is active in the initial system state. In this process,
we propose to describe the firings by a do loop in which each
line specifies one transition firing. Hence, Each line describes
the statements performed to ensure the actual transition firing.
We prefix the sequence of statements ensuring the firing by
the Promela construct atomic in order to guarantee that the
sequence of composed actions has to be executed as one
indivisible unit, non-interleaved with any other processes.
To illustrate this Promela description of a Petri net and its
behavior, we present in Fig. 4 the Promela description of the
Petri net in Fig. 3.
Once presenting how to specify the encryption scheme for
WSNs in Promela, we expose in the next section the LTL
formulation of correctness properties.
V. LTL BASED WSN VERIFICATION
Properties to be verified by SPIN have to be expressed
in Linear Temporal Logic. Once a LTL formula is specified,
SPIN provides an algorithm for converting it into equivalent
finite-state automata over infinite words (Bu¨chi automata).
Never claim is the Promela model of the Bu¨chi automata
corresponding to the LTL formula which is used to specify
system behavior which should never occur. When generating
a verifier, SPIN creates one active process for the never claim
declared. The never claim process will be executed by the
Fig. 4. Promela model relative to Petri net of Fig. 3
verifier between every execution of other processes yielding
the verifier to report error if the never claim process ends.
In concrete terms, suppose we want to express the property
Prop which states that the place P23 of the Petri net given in
Fig. 3 will eventually always be marked. Then, a proposition
p which specifies that place P23 is marked should be written
in Promela as follows:
#define p (PL[23] >= 1)
The LTL formula of Prop is F : <> [ ]p. It corresponds to
the bu¨chi automata of Fig. 5.
Fig. 5. A bu¨chi automata corresponding to formula F
A never claim consists on a negation of the property, which
is in our case the following LTL formula:
! <> [ ]p = [ ]![ ]p = [ ] <>!p
This formula corresponds to the bu¨chi automata of Fig. 6.
The never claim (generated by Spin) corresponding to
formula F is given in Fig. 7.
Fig. 6. A bu¨chi automata corresponding to the negation of F
Fig. 7. The never claim corresponding to F
Now referring to the proposed Promela specification, added
by propositions description by means of macro definition
#define, we can formulate in LTL different kinds of prop-
erties. Such properties include but are not limited to liveness
(deadlock freedom) and safeness.
A. Verification of deadlock freeness property
The deadlock freeness property states that it should be
possible to execute a random task by following the appropriate
route through the Petri net i.e. there are no dead transitions.
In other terms, we have to verify that each transition will fire
at least once (i.e. in an execution path). So, we may check if
the following formula is verified:
♦ live
where live is a proposition defined in Promela as follows:
#define live (
j=|T |−1
&&
j=0
(TR[j] > 0))
The verification of the deadlock freeness property for the
Petri net of Fig 3 is given in Fig. 8. In this figure, showing
a part of our example verification by SPIN, we see that
the corresponding Petri net is live. This is mentioned by:
• • • errors : 0 • ••.
Fig. 8. Verification of the deadlock freeness of Petri net of figure 3
B. Safeness property
The property of safeness can be determined for both indi-
vidual places and the entire net. A place is said to be safe if
for all possible markings the number of tokens in that place
never exceeds one. The Petri net is said safe if all the places
in the net are safe.
In LTL, we express safeness by the following formula:
 safe
where safe is a proposition defined in Promela as follows:
#define safe (
i=|P |−1
&&
i=0
(PL[i] <= 1))
For the overall Petri net (Fig. 3) the safeness is verified.
VI. CONCLUSION
Wireless Sensor Networks are increasingly being required
for applications where security and data integrity need to be
guaranteed. Hence, the formal verification of these important
properties for WSN models is promising since it can avoid
critical problems by detecting them at an early stage yielding
to their correction before execution stage.
In this context, we presented in this paper an approach
for the verification of an encryption scheme for Wireless
Sensor Networks modelled by Petri nets using one of the main
powerful formal methods: model checking. More precisely, we
have shown that model checking is a powerful technique to
verify and to detect the eventual errors at an early stage and
that a simple study of the generated counterexample permits
to correct these errors before the system deployment.
We first have shown how to write a Promela description of
a given WSN model specified by a Petri net. Second, we have
studied the properties of deadlock-freeness and safeness of the
studied WSN model and expressed these properties in Linear
Temporal Logic.
Future work will include verification of other properties
related to WSNs such as integrity and security properties.
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